View Issue Details
| ID | Project | Category | View Status | Date Submitted | Last Update |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0002326 | 10000-006: Mappings | public | 2013-01-18 15:45 | 2014-03-11 16:53 | |
| Reporter | Matthias Damm | Assigned To | Jim Luth | ||
| Priority | normal | Severity | major | Reproducibility | always |
| Status | closed | Resolution | no change required | ||
| Summary | 0002326: Clarification regarding certificate checks necessary | ||||
| Description | Based on input from Randy, OPC UA requires that certificate chains are only checked until the first certificate in the chain is contained in the trust list. The configuration schema defines an Issuer certificate store in addition to the Trusted certificate store to be able to check the whole certificate chain without trusting the whole chain. It makes no sense to have this Issure certificate store if it is not required to check the whole chain. We need a clear and consistent definition in the OPC UA specification. | ||||
| Tags | No tags attached. | ||||
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| related to | 0002325 | closed | Randy Armstrong | NodeSets, XSDs and Generated Code | Inconsistency between certificate test cases and stack requirements |
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Gerhard has captured the intent of the specification as written. The main issue is the long standing requirement to allow trust even if issuer certificates are unavailable (based on a belief that the admins will do the right thing – a belief that I now feel is naive). We need to accommodate this use case even as we ensure our best practice guidelines make it clear that all issuers should be available via the chain or in the issuers store. From: Gerhard Gappmeier [mailto:gerhard.gappmeier@ascolab.com] I agree with Randy More general I would say: E.g. A->(B)->C (C is signed by B, B is signed by A) About 1) Yes, and that's how OpenSSL works. PS: See https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/abstracts/ssl-client-bugs.html On Monday, January 21, 2013 09:28:22 AM Randy Armstrong wrote: 1) The stack should allow full chain validation even if a trusted cert is found early in the chain 2) The stack should allow a single certificate to be trusted for a CA without trusting all certificates from that CA while doing full chain validation. 3) The stack should have a place to store offline CRLs for the full chain even if an individual certificate is trusted We can work back from these requirements and see what options are available. From: Matthias Damm [mailto:matthias.damm@ascolab.com] Hi Jim, During the review of the latest ANSI C stack changes we found security issues and inconsistency between
The main inconsistency is In entered three related Mantis issues for Part 6 (2326), test cases (2325) and ANSI C stack (2324) We need a high priority discussion and decisions to be able to finish new stack releases. Kind Regards Matthias Damm
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Need to discuss if spec changes are required. |
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334 stack build now checks the entire chain. No updates needed to Part 6. |
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Part 6 does not require update. |
| Date Modified | Username | Field | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013-01-18 15:45 | Matthias Damm | New Issue | |
| 2013-01-18 15:45 | Matthias Damm | Relationship added | related to 0002325 |
| 2013-01-22 19:48 | Jim Luth | Note Added: 0004431 | |
| 2013-03-12 17:52 | Jim Luth | Status | new => assigned |
| 2013-03-12 17:52 | Jim Luth | Assigned To | => Randy Armstrong |
| 2013-10-05 17:53 | Randy Armstrong | Note Added: 0005038 | |
| 2013-10-05 17:53 | Randy Armstrong | Assigned To | Randy Armstrong => Jim Luth |
| 2013-10-05 17:53 | Randy Armstrong | Status | assigned => feedback |
| 2014-03-11 16:52 | Jim Luth | Note Added: 0005309 | |
| 2014-03-11 16:53 | Jim Luth | Status | feedback => closed |
| 2014-03-11 16:53 | Jim Luth | Note Added: 0005310 | |
| 2014-03-11 16:53 | Jim Luth | Resolution | open => no change required |